Crouching Yeti Crouching Yeti

  • First known sample

    2010

  • Discovery

    2014

  • Number of targets

    1000-3000

  • Current status

    Active

  • Type

    Backdoor , Remote administration tool

  • Targeted platforms

    Windows

  • TOP targeted countries

    CIS , France , Germany , Ireland , Italy , Japan , Poland , Spain , Turkey , Ukraine

  • The way of propagation

    Exploits , Social engineering , Trojanized software installers , Watering hole attacks

  • Purpose/Functions

    Data wiping
  • Special features
    Interest in OPC/SCADA. Trojanized software used to administer remote OPC servers as well as modules to scan networks for OPC servers.

  • Targets

    Construction , Education , Industrial/machinery , Information technology , Manufacturing , Pharmaceutical
  • Artefacts/Attribution
    Russian-speaking authors
  • Description

    An APT actor active since 2010 that launches information-stealing campaigns. By repackaging legitimate software installers and utilizing waterhole attacks, the group installs backdoors in targeted systems. The primary victims are organizations representing the industrial/machinery building sector of European countries, the US, China, and Japan.

    Additional information

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  1. Adding detection for known modules
  2. Collecting samples
  3. Reversing the samples
  4. Decrypting sophisticated encryption and compression schemes
  5. Understanding lateral movement
  6. Outlining multiple attack stages in the correct order
  7. Mapping C&C infrastructure
  8. Setting up sinkholes
  9. Analyzing collected traffic and communication protocols
  10. Crawling other hosts that understand the same protocol
  11. Taking down and acquiring images of C&C servers
  12. Identifying victims, sending out notifications to victims and global CERTs
  13. Applying forensic analysis and extracting logs, stolen files, other components
  14. Collecting and analyzing data from KSN, C&C servers, individual victims who are willing to work with us, sinkholes, crawlers, etc.
  15. Writing a comprehensive report
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